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Ince: Fourth Amendment

EAVESDROPPING UNDER NEW YORK AND FEDERAL LAW:
HOW NEW YORK IS DEPARTING FROM LONG-STANDING
INTERPRETATIONS MIRRORING FEDERAL LAW
NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Rabb1
(decided February 15, 2011)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Reginald Rabb was indicted by a grand jury for
second-degree grand larceny and enterprise corruption for using
coercive techniques against construction companies.2 The Supreme
Court denied defendant‟s motion to suppress, to which Rabb pled
guilty to the previously-mentioned offenses, in addition to others.3
Defendant was then sentenced to a term of eight-and-a-half to seventeen years‟ imprisonment.4 Rabb‟s accomplice, Steven Mason, also
pled guilty to most of the crimes committed by Rabb after the Supreme Court denied his motion to suppress, too.5 Mason was sentenced to a prison term of seven-and-a-half to fifteen years.6
Both defendants appealed the judgment, alleging that the eavesdropping warrant application failed to meet the requirements necessary for permitting the use of electronic surveillance, and thus violated their Fourth Amendment rights.7 Specifically, defendants
1

945 N.E.2d 447 (N.Y. 2011).
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 450.
3
Id. Apart from the enterprise corruption and grand larceny charges, Rabb also pled
guilty to attempted grand larceny and criminal possession of a weapon. Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. Mason pled guilty to all the same crimes as Rabb did except for the criminal possession of a weapon charge. Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 450.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 448. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
2

823
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alleged that the People “failed to establish that normal investigative
measures had been exhausted, were reasonably unlikely to succeed if
tried, or were too dangerous to employ,” thereby violating New York
Criminal Procedure Law section 700.15.8 Pursuant to CPL 700.15,
investigators may not utilize electronic eavesdropping as an initial
first step, which is what Rabb and Mason believed they did.9
After review, the judgments were affirmed by the Appellate
Division which held that the warrant applications complied with New
York law and therefore the warrant was valid.10 On appeal, the Court
of Appeals found supporting evidence for this conclusion and affirmed the judgments against Rabb and Mason.11 The purpose of this
article is to analyze whether the Court of Appeals should have borrowed from CPL 700‟s federal counterpart when following electronic
eavesdropping procedures.
II.

THE OPINION–PEOPLE V. RABB

In 2002, the Labor Racketeering Unit of the New York District Attorney‟s Office (“LRU”) commenced an investigation into
suspected racketeering of Akbar‟s Community Services (“AKS”), a
minority labor coalition.12 Derrick Walker and his associate, Frederick Rasberry, headed AKS and used the coalition to “force construction companies, under the threat of vandalism or intimidation, to hire
coalition workers and/or pay money for „security‟ from intimidation
from other labor coalitions.”13 To aid their investigation, the LRU
planted an undercover investigator to pose as a construction company
owner.14
Defendants Rabb and Mason were implicated in the criminal
activities of Walker and Rasberry when, in May 2004, the undercover

and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 448.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 448-49.
11
Id. at 453.
12
Id. at 449.
13
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 449.
14
Id.
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officer conducted an interview with another construction company
owner.15 The interviewee claimed not to have been contacted by either Walker or Rasberry, but rather by an agent for a company called
P & D.16 After obtaining telephone records, LRU discovered that this
agent had placed over seventy calls to Walker and Rasberry over a
six month period.17 Moreover, investigators soon learned that the
phone number on the agent‟s business card was registered to defendant Rabb.18
Around February 2005, an agent from another construction
company approached LRU and claimed to have been confronted by a
representative from P & D demanding that her company use laborers
from the community on all of her job sites. 19 The business card the
agent handed to her had the same phone number on it as the business
card handed to the other contractor.20
After this incident, LRU applied for and was granted an eavesdropping warrant against Rabb in March of 2005.21 The purpose of
the surveillance, set forth in the warrant, was to “determine the full
scope of Rabb‟s leadership position in P & D and gather sufficient
evidence to prosecute the participants in that illegal conduct.”22 In
November, LRU secured an eavesdropping warrant against Mason,
setting forth the same goals.23 LRU used the information gathered
from these warrants to aid its prosecution, and both Mason and Rabb
pled guilty to, most significantly, enterprise corruption.24
Under New York law, an eavesdropping warrant may be issued only “[u]pon a showing that normal investigative procedures
have been tried and have failed, or reasonably appear to be unlikely
to succeed if tried, or to be too dangerous to employ.”25 Additionally,
“[a] full and complete statement of facts” confirming the existence of
at least one of the above requirements must accompany an applica15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 449.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 449-50.
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 450.
Id.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.15(4) (McKinney 2011).
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tion for an eavesdropping warrant.26
On appeal, both defendants challenged the judgments against
them, asserting that investigators improperly used eavesdropping as
an initial first step in the investigation against them and that these investigators did not provide a particularized showing that traditional
investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.27 Additionally,
Rabb alleges that the People failed to satisfy the particularity requirements in that they relied on their investigatory experiences with
Walker and Rasberry rather than what actually happened during their
investigation into Rabb.28 Furthermore, defendants argued that the
use and success of other surveillance techniques, such as “undercover
operations, witness interviews and search warrants in the Walker/Rasberry investigation,” proves that normal investigative techniques would have provided the same success to their investigation,
which would have invalidated the People‟s argument that such procedures were unlikely to succeed.29
The Appellate Division and Court of Appeals disagreed with
defendants and affirmed the judgments against them.30 The Court of
Appeals found that the People had sufficiently satisfied the requirements under N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law sections 700.15(4) and
700.20(2)(d).31 According to the court‟s analysis, wiretapping was
not the initial step in LRU‟s investigation of P & D: the application
referenced the May 2004 meeting between the P & D agent and
another construction contractor; the application acknowledged the
registration of the phone number back to defendant Rabb and P & D;
Rasberry implicated P & D in an interview with an LRU undercover
agent; and evidence of continuous telephone communications between Rabb‟s phone number and Walker, Rasberry, companies with
known ties to organized crime, and companies that had previous encounters with Akbar.32
26

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.20(2)(d) (McKinney 2011).
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 451.
28
Id. at 451. Defendants do not, however, challenge the trial court‟s determination that
the eavesdropping warrants were issued based upon probable cause. Id.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 700.15(2), (3), (5).
29
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 451.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 451-52. As a result of the eavesdropping performed on Walker, the investigation
turned up dozens of phone calls that took place between Walker and Rabb. Id. at 452.
27
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Furthermore, the court found that the attempts to identify
Rabb through other surveillance techniques proved unsuccessful.33 In
addition, the court noted how there was evidence in the record to
support the lower court‟s finding that “normal investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.”34 For example:
[T]he LRU investigator explained that physical surveillance was of limited use because, although it might
show subjects meeting with each other, it would rarely
allow LRU to hear the conversations, and that any attempts by LRU investigators to get closer to the subjects to hear the conversations would render it more
likely that the subjects would discover they were under investigation.35
The application also pointed out how various avenues of evidencegathering would also prove ineffective.36 Search warrants would
have an equal effect, creating a prospect that the confidentiality of the
investigation would be compromised, leading to the destruction of inculpatory records.37 Lastly, undercover operations with Akbar exposed their limitations, leading LRU to believe an investigation into
P & D, a similar organization with similar activities, would be just as
restrictive.38
The People drew on their “experiences from the Walker/Rasberry investigation” to demonstrate why “normal investigative
techniques would be ineffective as to Rabb” and P & D.39 Defendants contended that the use of general allegations against minority
These phone conversations detailed collusive efforts between Akbar and P & D and also
tipped off investigators where meetings between Walker and Rabb would take place. Rabb,
945 N.E.2d at 452. All efforts to observe these meeting, however, proved unsuccessful in
identifying Rabb. Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 452-53.
36
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 453. Issuing grand jury subpoenas would publicize the investigation to the custodians of business records, a grand jury investigation would be futile because
the “witnesses were participants in the criminal conduct, and victims of that conduct would
be unlikely to testify out of fear of retaliation.” Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. LRU‟s undercover operations consisted mainly of paying Rasberry and Walker
$800 per month. Id. LRU came to the conclusion that a similar undercover investigation
into P & G would be no more likely to succeed than the one against Akbar. Id.
39
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 453.
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labor coalitions failed to satisfy the requirement of particularity for
eavesdropping warrants, but the court pointed to the intercepted
phone calls, collusive efforts to conduct criminal activities, and the
similarities of the two organizations‟ objectives to reject their contentions.40
In short, the Court of Appeals ruled that although eavesdropping is prohibited as a routine initial step in surveillance, law enforcement officials are not required to resort to futile techniques.41 In
other words, it is unnecessary for law enforcement to exhaust all conceivable techniques that will clearly be unproductive before resorting
to electronic surveillance.42 It is sufficient for an affidavit to describe
how standard techniques have been tried or would be ineffective in
order to satisfy CPL 700.15 and 700.20, as was the case here.43
III.

THE FEDERAL APPROACH AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE NEW
YORK LEGISLATURE

Intercepting conversations via electronic devices is considered
a search under the Fourth Amendment.44 In 1968, Congress enacted
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (“Title
III”) to provide guidance when wiretap evidence is at issue.45 Title
III was a response to the United State Supreme Court‟s ruling in
Berger v. New York,46 where the Court held that eavesdropping warrants must state with particularity the premises to be searched and the
persons to be seized.47 Title III satisfies the Court‟s requirements by
“incorporat[ing] the Fourth Amendment‟s protections by placing
probable cause and particularity conditions on the issuance of a wiretap.”48 As such, electronic surveillance that comports with the re-

40

Id.
Id.
42
Id. (citing United States v. Concepcion, 579 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2009)).
43
Id. (citing United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 310 (2d Cir. 1983).
44
See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) (holding that the interception of a
conversation via an electronic device is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); see also U.S. CONST amend. IV, supra note 7.
45
United States v. Serrano, 450 F. Supp. 2d 227, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
46
388 U.S. 41 (1967).
47
Id. at 55.
48
Serrano, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 235 (quoting United States v. Segura, No. 3:99CR85(EBB),
2001 WL 286850, at *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 27, 2001)).
41
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quirements under Title III satisfies the Fourth Amendment.49
In Berger, the constitutionality of New York‟s then-current
eavesdropping statute was called into question.50 Section 813-a of
New York‟s Code of Criminal Procedure authorized the use of eavesdropping upon “oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the
attorney general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant of any police department of the state or of any political subdivision thereof . .
. .”51 This oath had to establish a “reasonable ground to believe that
evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and particularly describe[ing] the person or persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be overheard or recorded and the purpose
thereof . . . .”52
While this statute satisfied the Fourth Amendment by requiring a neutral and independent authority to issue the order,53 the broad
application and scope of the statute is what immediately captured the
attention of the Supreme Court.54 The Court noted that there was a
probable cause problem with the statute‟s language, which allowed a
warrant to be issued upon a showing that “there [are] reasonable
ground[s] to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained
. . . .”55 This was an issue because, according to the Supreme Court,
“[p]robable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists where the
facts and circumstances within the affiant‟s knowledge, and of which
he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.”56 Having reasonable grounds
to believe that the issuance of this warrant may lead to evidence of a
crime is clearly not the same as believing that a crime has taken place
or will soon take place.
Thus, New York‟s eavesdropping statute lacked the particu49
See United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1121 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[S]urveillance that is
properly authorized and carried out under Title III complies with the fourth amendment.”).
50
Berger, 388 U.S. at 43.
51
Id. at 54.
52
Berger, 388 U.S. at 70 (Black, J., dissenting).
53
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“[The Fourth Amendment‟s] protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.”).
54
Berger, 388 U.S. at 54.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 55.
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larity requirements the Fourth Amendment demands and as such it
was ruled to be unconstitutional.57 In response to the Court‟s holding, Congress enacted Title III to address Berger‟s concerns regarding the Fourth Amendment and to set forth the requirements for issuing an eavesdropping warrant.58 In addition, New York also
responded to the decision by formulating a new eavesdropping statute
that was heavily influenced by Title III.59 In many respects, New
York‟s current eavesdropping statute, codified as CPL 700, contains
provisions that are identical or substantially the same as its federal
counterpart.60
For example, in New York, the application to obtain an eavesdropping warrant cannot be granted without “a showing that normal
investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried, or to be too dangerous to
employ.”61 In addition, the application for the warrant must contain
“[a] full and complete statement of facts establishing” those showings.62 Likewise, Title III requires an electronic surveillance warrant
application to contain “a full statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.”63 Federal law also requires the judge granting the warrant to
determine that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and
have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or
to be too dangerous.”64
57

Id. at 64.
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 454 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting).
59
Serrano, 450 F. Supp.2d at 236 n.76 (“The federal and New York State statutory requirements for obtaining an electronic eavesdropping warrant are basically the same and
there is no discernible difference between federal and state case law regarding these requirements.”). In Rabb, Judge Pigott, writing for the majority, noted how it was the New
York State Legislature‟s intention to “conform „State standards for court-authorized eavesdropping warrants with federal standards.‟ ” Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 450 (quoting People v.
McGrath, 385 N.E.2d 541, 547 (N.Y. 1978)).
60
Id. at 450 (noting that it was not merely coincidental that the provisions of Title III and
CPL 700 are substantively identical because it was the New York Legislature‟s intent to conform New York eavesdropping standards to that of federal standards).
61
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.15.
62
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.20(2)(d).
63
18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) (2006).
64
18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). It is a prerequisite under both New York and federal law to
demonstrate that less intrusive investigation techniques had be tried or would be futile if attempted. See United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Both [New York and
58
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In addition, neither New York law nor federal law requires
law enforcement agents to exhaust all other possible avenues of surveillance before resorting to electronic surveillance.65 So long as
employing a wiretap is not a routine initial step or used when traditional investigative techniques would be sufficient, the use of a wiretap will be valid.66 All that is required for an electronic surveillance
warrant is a demonstration that those traditional techniques would fail
or be likely to fail.67
IV.

INSTANCES WHERE NEW YORK PROVIDES EQUAL OR MORE
PROTECTION THAN TITLE III

Despite the identical, or at the very least substantially similar
language of CPL 700 to Title III, the New York Court of Appeals has
interpreted some provisions of CPL 700 more narrowly than Title III.
For example, in People v. Washington,68 law enforcement officers
failed to seal the tape recording from electronic surveillance until
thirty-nine days after the expiration of the warrant.69 CPL 700.50(2)
requires the officers to present the recordings to a judge “immediately
upon the expiration of the period of an eavesdropping or video sur-

federal law] require a showing that investigative procedures less intrusive than a wiretap
have been tried or are unlikely to succeed if tried.”).
65
See Sarrano, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (“ „Neither the New York nor the federal statute
requires that any particular investigative procedures be exhausted before a wiretap may be
authorized.‟ ” (quoting Lilla, 699 F.2d at 104)).
66
See United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (noting how the New York and federal statutes are “designed to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where
traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime”). Because CPL § 700
is substantively identical to Title III, the Court of Appeals in Rabb cited to federal law as
persuasive authority to establish that law enforcement officials need not “exhaust all conceivable investigative techniques before resorting to electronic surveillance.” Rabb, 945
N.E.2d at 452 (citing Concepcion, 579 F.3d at 218).
67
See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974) (explaining that applicant for a
wiretap “must state and the court must find that normal investigative procedures have been
tried and failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous” (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(c), (3)(c))); see also Lilla, 699 F.2d at 103 (stating that an
affidavit “must provide some basis for concluding that less intrusive investigative procedures
are not feasible”). But see United States v. Maxwell, 25 F.3d 1389, 1394 (8th Cir. 1994)
(“Even if conventional techniques have been somewhat successful, however, a wiretap may
still be authorized.” (citing United States v. O‟Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1415 (8th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988), and, 488 U.S. 1011 (1989))).
68
385 N.E.2d 593 (N.Y. 1978).
69
Id. at 594.
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veillance warrant.”70 The court ruled that the tapes were due to the
judge immediately upon the expiration of that particular warrant or
extension, and not at the termination of the original order.71 On the
contrary, in United States v. Fury,72 the Second Circuit held that the
government only needed to seal the tapes once the extension of the
original order was terminated.73
In People v. Winograd,74 the police failed to seal and present
the tapes to a different justice when the issuing justice was unavailable due to a religious holiday.75 The Court of Appeals held that the
mistake by the police did not constitute a valid excuse and the tapes
should have been suppressed.76 However, in United States v.
Massino,77 an excuse was provided and accepted by the court for failing to immediately seal the tapes, allowing the tapes to be admissible.78 Furthermore, federal courts depart from the New York‟s demand for immediacy, allowing for delays ranging from six to fortytwo days depending on the circumstances.79
Perhaps one of the more significant departures of CPL 700
from Title III was the New York Legislature‟s intent to use eavesdropping as a primary weapon against organized crime.80 The court
70

Id.; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.50(2).
Washington, 385 N.E.2d at 598.
72
554 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1977).
73
Id. at 533.
74
502 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1986).
75
Id. at 191.
76
Id. at 195. See also People v. Gallina, 485 N.E.2d 216, 220 (N.Y. 1985) (“Inadequate
police procedures, apparently responsible for the delay, do not constitute a valid excuse. Nor
does the unavailability of the issuing justice constitute a valid excuse for the failure to timely
seal the tapes produced by wiretap four in a county where several other justices are present
each business day.” (citing Washington, 385 N.E.2d at 597-98)).
77
784 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1986).
78
Id. at 158. See also Fury, 554 F.2d at 533 (holding that a six-day delay due to the unavailability of the supervising judge was a reasonable excuse).
79
See United States v. McGrath, 622 F.2d 36, 43 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a “relatively
short” delay of three to eight days is excusable where the tapes have to be shipped to their
destination); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a seven-day delay where there was a lack of bad faith or attempt to evade the statute‟s provisions
was excusable); United States v. Poeta, 455 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that a thirteen-day delay caused by confusion over which judge would seal the tapes did not require
suppression); United States v. Caruso, 415 F. Supp. 847, 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that
twenty-four and forty-two day delays do not warrant suppression when efforts were made to
prepare the tapes for sealing and when the prosecutor heading the investigation was hospitalized).
80
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 451.
71
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in Rabb acknowledged how former Governor Rockefeller championed the eavesdropping law for providing “greater flexibility in the
employment of eavesdropping as an effective weapon against
crime[,]” especially against organized crime where evidence is often
difficult to collect for prosecution.81 The New York Legislature recognized the “tight structure of organized crime groups, their use of
brutal force to discourage informants, and the high degree to which
key members have insulated themselves from criminal liability.”82
Therefore, traditional investigative and surveillance techniques most
frequently result in the arrest and conviction of lower-echelon members of organized crime groups and not the leaders.83 By contrast, no
federal laws or cases emphasize the importance or use of eavesdropping as it relates to organized crime.84
In other ways, however, the Court of Appeals has interpreted
identical or substantially similar provisions in ways that demand no
more than what the federal law requires. Neither CPL 700 nor Title
III requires that the eavesdropping warrant specifically state the telephone number to be tapped.85 Instead, as long as the telephone line is
specified in the application, the electronic surveillance will be
upheld.86
Additionally, Title III requires law enforcement officials to
file progress reports if the issuing judge so demands,87 usually in order to facilitate the judge‟s supervision of the wiretap.88 However,
the Second Circuit in United States v. Scafidi89 denied the defendant‟s
81

Id.
Id.
83
Id.
84
See id. at 455 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Title III contains “no special dispensation for organized crime investigations”).
85
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2518; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 700.20.
86
See People v. Darling, 742 N.E.2d 596, 600 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that the telephone
number does not need to be stated in the warrant and noting that 18 U.S.C. § 2518 also does
not require a specific telephone number). See also United States v. Feldman, 606 F.2d 673,
680 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that listing the specific telephone numbers is not required under
the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment or Title III).
87
18 U.S.C. § 2518(6).
88
See Scafidi, 564 F.2d at 641 (stating that the progress reports are “designed to enable
the district judge to evaluate the continuing need for surveillance”); People v. Marino, 403
N.E.2d 179, 180 (N.Y. 1980) (explaining that while CPL 700.50 does not mandate progress
reports, a supervising judge may require them in order to be informed of the status of the investigation).
89
564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1977).
82
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motion to suppress the eavesdropping evidence despite the government‟s failure to file the reports in a timely fashion.90 Similarly, in
People v. Marino,91 the Court of Appeals held that the failure of the
District Attorney to file progress reports as per CPL 700.50 did not
warrant suppression of the eavesdropping tapes.92 As such, the language of CPL 700.50 and its federal counterpart are substantively
similar, and the sanctions imposed for violating those provisions are
similar too.
V.

INSTANCES WHERE NEW YORK CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL
INTERPRETATIONS BY OFFERING LESS PROTECTION THAN
TITLE III

It is clear that Title III heavily influenced the New York Legislature when it drafted CPL 700. As mentioned above, the New
York law relating to exhausting investigative methods and employing
methods that would be useless or ineffective was largely borrowed
from federal law.93 However, there are also instances where New
York did not borrow the interpretations of Title III and instead offers
less protection.
As pointed out by the dissent in Rabb, it is arguable that the
People did not satisfy the requirements for an eavesdropping warrant.94 The warrant application against Rabb and P & D was granted
after an investigation into Akbar and its principals, Walker and Rasberry.95 At the time, investigators believed that Rabb was somehow
connected to the racketeering activities of Akbar, but the extent of
these activities was unascertained.96 Moreover, the supporting affidavit accompanying the warrant application contained generalized
statements about Rabb‟s activities, and most of the arguments in the
affidavit were virtually identical to those arguments from the Akbar
warrant application.97
90

Id. at 641.
403 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1980).
92
Id. at 180.
93
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 450.
94
Id. at 458-59 (Lippmann, C.J., dissenting).
95
Id. at 455.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 456-57. The dissent noted that the allegations purporting to establish a need for a
wiretap occupied less than four pages of the entire sixty-four page affidavit. Rabb, 945
91
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The most important aspect of the dissent‟s analysis is noting
the lack of particulars in the warrant application which are required
by the Fourth Amendment when granting an eavesdropping warrant.98 In the affidavit, the People only noted “a number” of traditional surveillance attempts at identifying Rabb or P & D before applying for an eavesdropping warrant, claiming that “normal
investigative procedures [had] been tried and [had] failed.”99 Most of
the supporting information in the affidavit was based solely on the
investigation into Akbar and not into Rabb.100 It appeared as though
the court granting the warrant relied on the results of normal investigative methods used against Akbar to determine that those same
methods would be ineffective against Rabb.101
By permitting a judge to issue a warrant against one organization based on the successful – or unsuccessful – nature of investigative techniques employed against a separate, albeit related organization, the court is circumventing constitutional protections.102
Essentially, by reiterating the arguments made for the Akbar warrant,
the People explained why the previous investigative methods failed
for Akbar, not Rabb and P & D, therefore failing to satisfy CPL
700.15(4) and 700.20(2)(d).103
Several federal cases have addressed similar situations as this
one, providing greater clarity and interpretation for New York‟s statutory counterpart. For example, in United States v. Santora,104 an

N.E.2d at 456-57 (Lippmann, C.J., dissenting). In addition, most of those arguments were
“barely distinguishable” from the arguments set forth against Walker and Rasberry, drawing
the inference that the government just substituted those names for Rabb and P & D. Id. at
456.
98
Id. at 457.
99
Id. at 456.
100
Id.
101
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 456 (Lippmann, C.J., dissenting).
102
This bears on the particularity requirements needed to issue a warrant. The grounds
for issuing the warrant must be specific to the person against whom the warrant is being issued. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.”). Substituting the particulars from one investigation to
another ignores the particularity requirements for the specific investigation. United States v.
Gonzalez, Inc., 412 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2005).
103
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d.at 457. See also United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821, 826 (9th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 942 (1978) (“Less intrusive investigative procedures may
succeed with one putative participant while they may not succeed with another.”).
104
600 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 3 [2012], Art. 25

836

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

initial eavesdropping warrant had been granted for an investigation
into a conspiracy for selling airline tickets, but the court refused to
grant subsequent eavesdropping warrants during the same investigation.105 The court determined that the applications for the subsequent
warrants were not sufficiently made out and that the government
could not “dispense with the required [particularity] showing when
applying to tap the telephones of other conspirators.”106 Similarly, in
United States v. Gonzalez, Inc.,107 the court found that previously issued eavesdropping warrants did not provide a sufficient basis to
demonstrate the necessity of further wiretaps.108
This is the first instance where the Court of Appeals has directly departed from the federal approach concerning electronic eavesdropping. In Rabb, the court issued an eavesdropping warrant
against Rabb and P & D solely based on the People‟s prior experience with their investigation into Akbar.109 Although P & D and
Akbar were similar organizations with similar objectives, there is little to no evidence supporting a claim that both were engaged in a
racketeering conspiracy or criminal enterprise.110
The dissent explained how, even if there had been any supporting evidence, “the showing of necessity made in justification of
the Akbar wiretaps was not transferrable to support the P & D wiretaps.”111 In essence, the majority dispensed with the necessity requirement for Rabb and P & D to justify transferring the necessity
found for employing wiretaps against Akbar to Rabb.112 This is in direct conflict with federal case law where courts have expressly forbidden dispensing with the statutorily mandated showing of necessity
105

Id. at 1321-22.
Id. at 1321.
107
412 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2005).
108
Id. at 1115 (“[T]he government is not free to transfer a statutory showing of necessity
from one application to another–even within the same investigation. This court has held that
an issuing judge may not examine various wiretap applications together when deciding
whether a new application meets the statutory necessity requirement. Each wiretap application must separately satisfy the necessity requirement.”). See United States v. Carneiro, 861
F.2d 1171, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating subsequent applications for wiretaps despite upholding the order granting the initial wiretap because the government failed to show
that particularized investigative methods were employed against each suspect and were unsuccessful or unlikely to be successful).
109
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 452.
110
Id. at 459 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting).
111
Id. (citing Santora, 600 F.2d at 1321-22; Gonzalez, 412 F.3d at 1115).
112
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 459.
106
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for a particular organization or person, regardless of their association
with the initial suspect or organization for which the original warrant
was issued.113
Because New York statutory law and case law regarding eavesdropping has a history of being influenced by Title III and other
federal cases, the dissent felt the court should have adopted this interpretation of CPL 700. Under this interpretation, the affidavit would
have been inadequate to support the issuance of the warrant, leading
to the suppression of the tapes against Rabb and Mason.114 It is unclear whether the Court of Appeals knowingly departed from the federal approach or did so indirectly. However, the fact remains that this
was the initial step to taking New York law on eavesdropping in a direction away from established federal case law. Given the history of
New York mirroring its interpretations of its own laws on eavesdropping on the federal approach, though, it is unlikely that this decision
will significantly impact the future of eavesdropping law in New
York.
Bailey Ince*

113

See Santora, 600 F.2d at 1321-22; Gonzalez, 412 F.3d at 1115.
Rabb, 945 N.E.2d at 460 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting). See id. at 458 (“There, of course,
was no remotely comparable history to recount with respect to the newly commenced investigation of „Divine‟ and P & D, and in its absence the affidavit's pat recitation of difficulties
endemic to organized crime probes was patently insufficient to explain why ordinary investigative means would likely be fruitless with respect to „Divine‟ and P & D.”).
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